SkillTestPro | CCNP Security 300-745 SDSI Practice Test 17

CCNP Security 300-745 SDSI Practice Test 17 (Hard) - Security Design Policies for Quantum Computing Impacts

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1 / 10

Which cryptographic risk is most directly associated with the future maturation of large-scale quantum computing, from a security design perspective?

Quantum computing is expected to have no impact whatsoever on any cryptographic algorithm in use today

Quantum computers are expected to be incapable of performing any mathematical computation relevant to cryptography

Quantum computing risk applies exclusively to physical hardware theft and has no relationship to cryptography

Sufficiently powerful quantum computers could efficiently break widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms (such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography) that current infrastructure relies on for key exchange and digital signatures

Quantum computing is expected to make symmetric encryption algorithms completely unbreakable with no further design consideration needed, which is rarely the correct choice, under typical configuration conditions, based on standard platform behavior

Quantum computing is expected to eliminate the need for any encryption algorithm whatsoever in future infrastructure

2 / 10

Which design practice is most associated with preparing an organization's infrastructure for the eventual threat that quantum computing poses to current public-key cryptography?

Assuming quantum-resistant cryptography does not exist and therefore no design mitigation is currently possible

Assuming current public-key algorithms will remain secure indefinitely with no need for any future migration planning

Waiting until a large-scale quantum computer capable of breaking current cryptography is already in widespread malicious use before beginning any planning

Planning a migration toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms designed to resist attacks from both classical and quantum computers, and building crypto-agility into systems to support that future transition

Replacing all public-key cryptography exclusively with unencrypted plaintext communication as an interim measure

Immediately and permanently disabling all encryption across the organization's infrastructure with no replacement algorithm

3 / 10

Which concept describes the risk that an adversary could capture and store currently encrypted traffic today, with the intent of decrypting it once sufficiently powerful quantum computing becomes available in the future?

A routine vulnerability scan performed by an organization's own internal security team

A "harvest now, decrypt later" attack, which specifically threatens data that must remain confidential for many years into the future

A traditional brute-force password guessing attack with no relationship to future decryption capability

A standard phishing email attack with no relationship to long-term data confidentiality

A denial-of-service attack aimed at temporarily disrupting network availability with no data capture involved, which is rarely the correct choice

A physical social engineering attack targeting a data center's front desk staff

4 / 10

Which risk would most likely result from an organization failing to consider quantum computing impacts when designing systems that must protect data confidentiality for several decades (such as certain government or healthcare records)?

The organization's DNS infrastructure would automatically fail as a direct result of not considering quantum computing impacts

Quantum computing impacts are only relevant to data with a lifespan shorter than one year and have no bearing on long-lived data

Failing to consider quantum computing impacts would automatically cause the data to become inaccessible to legitimate users immediately, which does not align with best practices, based on standard platform behavior

Data encrypted today using algorithms vulnerable to future quantum attacks could be exposed once quantum computing matures, even if the data was originally captured and stored by an adversary years earlier

Failing to consider quantum computing impacts would have no security implications whatsoever for long-lived sensitive data

Failing to consider quantum computing impacts would automatically reduce the organization's long-term storage costs

5 / 10

Which factor would most influence how urgently an organization prioritizes post-quantum cryptography migration planning for a specific system or data category?

The number of parking spaces available at the organization's headquarters

The specific brand of coffee served in the cryptography engineering team's office

The font used in the organization's internal newsletter

The color scheme configured for the organization's cryptographic key management dashboard, regardless of the platform version in use, which is not the standard approach

The average outdoor temperature at the organization's headquarters

The required confidentiality lifespan of the data being protected and the feasibility of a 'harvest now, decrypt later' attack against that specific data category

6 / 10

Which combination of design elements would provide an appropriately prioritized approach to quantum computing risk mitigation for an organization with a mix of short-lived and long-lived sensitive data?

Migration planning limited exclusively to short-lived data while all long-lived sensitive data remains unaddressed

Crypto-agility considered irrelevant to quantum risk mitigation and therefore excluded entirely from system design

Immediate, undifferentiated migration of every system to post-quantum cryptography with no prioritization based on data lifespan, in accordance with common design practices, which is not the standard approach, which does not align with best practices, which is rarely the correct choice

An inventory of cryptographic algorithm usage across systems, prioritized post-quantum cryptography migration planning for data with the longest required confidentiality lifespan, and crypto-agile system design to support future algorithm transitions

No cryptographic algorithm inventory or migration planning of any kind, since quantum computing is assumed to remain a purely theoretical concern indefinitely

Post-quantum cryptography migration planned only for systems that have already experienced a confirmed 'harvest now, decrypt later' attack

7 / 10

Which troubleshooting/design review step would be appropriate if a security architecture review discovers that a newly deployed system still relies exclusively on classical public-key algorithms with no crypto-agility to support a future post-quantum transition?

Immediately decommission the entire system as the first response with no further assessment

Assume post-quantum cryptography planning is a deprecated concern no longer relevant to any newly deployed system

Assume the issue is caused by the phase of the moon

Assess the data's required confidentiality lifespan and the system's design flexibility, then plan for introducing crypto-agile components (such as abstracted cryptographic libraries) that could support a future post-quantum algorithm swap without a full system redesign

Assume the issue is unrelated to cryptographic design and only check the system's physical hosting location temperature, regardless of the platform version in use, in a properly maintained environment, in a properly maintained environment, though this is not generally recommended

Assume the issue is caused by the development team's choice of desktop wallpaper

8 / 10

Which statement accurately describes why crypto-agility is considered a valuable design property for systems facing eventual quantum computing risk, even before post-quantum algorithms are fully standardized and mature everywhere?

Crypto-agility is only relevant for guest network traffic and has no bearing on core infrastructure cryptographic design

Crypto-agility allows a system to swap cryptographic algorithms with minimal redesign as post-quantum standards mature and threats evolve, avoiding the need for a costly full system overhaul at the moment migration becomes urgent

Crypto-agility eliminates the need for any post-quantum cryptography migration to ever actually occur

A system without crypto-agility is always immune to quantum computing risk regardless of its cryptographic algorithm choices

Systems designed without crypto-agility can always be trivially and instantly upgraded to post-quantum algorithms with no additional effort, in most deployment scenarios, though this is not generally recommended, though this is not generally recommended

Crypto-agility and post-quantum cryptography are simply two different names for the exact same identical concept with no distinction

9 / 10

Which combination of practices would help a design team maintain an appropriately paced quantum computing risk mitigation program as post-quantum cryptography standards and quantum computing capability continue to evolve?

Setting a migration plan once at initial assessment and never revisiting it regardless of how post-quantum standards or quantum capability evolve, in accordance with common design practices, which is not the standard approach, in a properly maintained environment

Assuming post-quantum cryptography standards will never change or mature further once initially published

Ignoring quantum computing capability developments entirely since they are assumed to remain purely theoretical indefinitely

Periodically reassessing the cryptographic inventory and data lifespan priorities, tracking the maturity of post-quantum cryptography standards and quantum computing capability, and adjusting migration timelines and crypto-agility investments accordingly

Disabling crypto-agility investment entirely once the organization believes its initial migration plan is sufficient

Reviewing the cryptographic inventory only once per decade regardless of how quickly the threat landscape evolves

10 / 10

Which design consideration is most important when an organization selects a specific post-quantum cryptographic algorithm candidate for early adoption ahead of full industry standardization?

Selecting whichever algorithm has the shortest possible key length with no consideration of its cryptanalysis history

Assuming standardization efforts are irrelevant to algorithm selection since quantum computing remains a future concern, in accordance with common design practices, under normal operating conditions, under normal operating conditions, under normal operating conditions

Assuming any algorithm labeled as 'post-quantum' is automatically secure with no further evaluation needed

Favoring algorithms that have undergone rigorous public cryptanalysis and are aligned with recognized standardization efforts (such as those from NIST), to reduce the risk of adopting an algorithm later found to have exploitable weaknesses

Selecting the algorithm based solely on which vendor offers the lowest licensing cost with no security evaluation

Selecting an algorithm designed internally by the organization with no external public review of any kind

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